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This	  paper	  intends	  to	  address	  the	  somewhat	  surprisingly	  scarce	  interest	  in	  human	  geography	  for	  the	  
broader	  spatialities	  of	  Auschwitz	  and,	  more	  in	  general,	  of	  Nazism	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  Several	  authors	  
have	  investigated	  specific	  aspects	  of	  the	  geographies	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich,	  including	  questions	  of	  landscape	  
and	  memory	  (Charlesworth,	  1992;	  1994;	  2003;	  2004a;	  2004b;	  Charlesworth	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Keil,	  2005;	  Olin,	  
1997;	  Stenning	  et	  al.,	  2008);	  spatial	  planning	  in	  the	  Third	  Reich	  (Clarke	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Elden,	  2003;	  2006a;	  
Rössler,	  1989;	  2001;	  Schenk	  and	  Bromley,	  2003);	  and	  the	  spatial	  organization	  of	  the	  ghetto	  (Cole,	  2003;	  
2009;	  Cole	  and	  Graham,	  1995).	  But	  despite	  these	  important	  contributions,	  a	  broad	  and	  open	  debate	  on	  
these	  questions	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  modernity	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  engaged	  by	  the	  discipline.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  striking	  in	  light	  of	  the	  current	  influence	  of	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  work	  in	  the	  discipline,	  since	  
Auschwitz	  is	  the	  archetype	  of	  the	  Agambenian	  definition	  of	  the	  camp-­‐as-­‐a-­‐space-­‐of-­‐exception	  (2002).	  	  
	  
The	  translation	  into	  English	  of	  Agamben’s	  work	  on	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  sovereign	  exception	  and	  the	  
concept	  of	  bare	  life	  has	  had	  a	  tremendous	  impact	  on	  recent	  debates	  centred	  on	  questions	  of	  biopolitics	  
and	  modernity.	  His	  provocative	  argument	  about	  a	  putative	  new	  global	  biopolitical	  nomos,	  partially	  
inspired	  by	  his	  reading	  of	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  was	  received	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  different	  disciplinary	  fields	  –	  a	  
reception	  that	  bears	  witness	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  implicit	  division	  of	  labour	  in	  English	  speaking	  academia.	  In	  
human	  geography,	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  the	  ‘spatial’	  dimension	  of	  Agamben’s	  writings,	  and	  their	  
important	  contribution	  to	  understanding	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  ‘the	  political’	  in	  
modernity.	  More	  specifically,	  a	  robust	  field	  of	  geographical	  literature	  (Ek,	  2006;	  Gregory,	  2006;	  Minca,	  
2006	  and	  the	  whole	  special	  issue	  of	  Geografiska	  Annaler	  B,	  88,	  4,	  2006;	  see	  also	  Minca,	  2005;	  2007;	  
Ramadan,	  2009)	  is	  now	  engaged	  with	  questions	  regarding	  the	  spatialities	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  a	  discussion	  
focused	  mainly	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  contemporary	  camps	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  new	  geographies	  produced	  by	  
the	  global	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  and	  largely	  inspired	  by	  Agamben’s	  work.	  A	  theoretical	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  
re-­‐appearance	  of	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  spatial-­‐political	  ‘paradigm’	  is	  certainly	  to	  be	  welcomed,	  especially	  in	  light	  
of	  the	  enormous	  importance	  played	  by	  Guantanamo	  and	  the	  geographies	  of	  extraordinary	  rendition	  
engineered	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration	  after	  9-­‐11	  (Raulff,	  2004).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  somewhat	  surprising,	  however,	  that	  when	  Auschwitz	  is	  mentioned	  by	  literature	  focusing	  on	  
Agamben’s	  work	  particular	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  witnessing	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  on	  the	  
impossibility	  of	  translating	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  camp	  into	  any	  linguistic	  expression	  (Cohen,	  2002;	  Davis,	  
2004;	  Diken	  and	  Laustsen,	  2005).	  This	  emphasis	  is,	  again,	  relevant	  and	  must	  be	  welcomed;	  nonetheless,	  it	  
risks	  reading	  ‘Auschwitz’	  solely	  in	  its	  metaphorical	  dimension,	  while	  marginalizing	  the	  historical	  and	  
geographical	  dimensions	  that	  translated	  it	  into	  a	  violent	  spatialisation	  of	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  exception,	  
as	  Agamben	  would	  claim.	  	  
	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  address	  this	  gap	  in	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  Auschwitz	  and	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  
contribution	  to	  the	  reading	  of	  Agamben’s	  concept	  of	  the	  camp,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  contemporary	  
interdisciplinary	  debate	  on	  the	  ‘calculative	  rationalities’	  (Elden,	  2006a;	  2006b)	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Nazi	  
project.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  focus	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  ‘topographical’	  and	  
the	  ‘topological’,	  as	  described	  by	  Agamben	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  state	  of	  exception,	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  on	  
the	  nature	  of	  Auschwitz’s	  spatialities.	  	  
	  
The	  simple	  topographical	  opposition	  (inside/outside)	  implicit	  in	  these	  theories	  [on	  the	  state	  of	  exception]	  
seems	  insufficient	  to	  account	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  it	  should	  explain.	  […]	  In	  truth,	  the	  state	  of	  
exception	  is	  neither	  external	  nor	  internal	  to	  the	  juridical	  order,	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  defining	  it	  concerns	  
precisely	  a	  threshold,	  or	  a	  zone	  of	  indifference,	  where	  inside	  and	  outside	  do	  not	  exclude	  each	  other	  but	  
rather	  blur	  with	  each	  other.	  […]	  Hence	  the	  interest	  of	  those	  theories	  that,	  like	  Schmitt’s,	  complicate	  the	  
topographical	  opposition	  into	  a	  more	  complex	  topological	  relation	  […].	  In	  any	  case,	  to	  understand	  the	  
problem	  of	  the	  state	  of	  exception,	  one	  must	  first	  correctly	  determine	  its	  localization	  (or	  illocalization).	  As	  
we	  will	  see,	  the	  conflict	  over	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  presents	  itself	  essentially	  as	  a	  dispute	  over	  its	  proper	  
locus	  (Agamben,	  2005:	  23-­‐24,	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  
The	  topographical	  is	  intended	  here	  as	  a	  ‘measure	  of	  space’	  and/or	  spatial	  measure,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  
attempt	  to	  ‘spatialise’	  a	  set	  of	  calculative	  rationalities	  into	  a	  projected	  reduction	  of	  reality	  to	  the	  
coordinates	  of	  that	  very	  same	  measure.	  The	  ‘topological’	  for	  Agamben	  is	  instead,	  to	  put	  it	  simply,	  a	  broad	  
category	  that	  comprises,	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  camp,	  that	  ‘which	  remains’	  beyond/despite	  the	  
imposition	  of	  such	  a	  strict	  and	  violently	  implemented	  regime	  of	  rational	  spatiality.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  this	  
remnant	  is,	  by	  definition,	  vast	  and	  indistinct;	  it	  is	  what	  cannot	  be	  contained	  by	  and	  reduced	  to	  Euclidian	  
geometry;	  it	  is	  the	  scarto	  (gap)	  that	  opens	  up	  in	  the	  biopolitical	  machine	  when	  it	  tries	  to	  make	  life	  and	  
calculations	  coincide.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  important	  to	  note	  that	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  
topological	  in	  the	  pages	  to	  follow	  is	  entirely	  tributary	  to	  Agamben’s	  reading	  of	  these	  terms.	  
	  
The	  opening	  section	  thus	  places	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  links	  between	  Agamben’s	  theory	  of	  the	  camp	  
and	  his	  concept	  of	  soglia	  (in	  Italian,	  soglia	  means	  threshold,	  but	  also	  gate/door/entry	  and	  limen,	  border,	  
space	  of	  passage	  and	  transition).	  This	  concept,	  we	  argue,	  provides	  very	  useful	  ground	  for	  a	  reflection	  on	  
the	  topological	  spatialities	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  a	  dimension	  that	  is	  only	  partially	  discussed	  by	  the	  specialist	  
literature.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  read	  the	  soglia	  as	  a	  field	  of	  tension	  between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  
topological;	  Auschwitz,	  we	  claim,	  despite	  its	  apparently	  rigorous	  geometries,	  represents	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  
paradigmatic	  field	  for	  the	  exploration	  of	  this	  tension	  and	  of	  broader	  Nazi	  biopolitical	  geographies.	  This	  
soglia,	  in	  Agamben’s	  terms,	  is	  therefore	  not	  so	  much	  the	  space-­‐in-­‐between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  
topological.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  where	  the	  two	  come	  together	  in	  a	  regime	  of	  exception:	  a	  space	  where	  they	  
inevitably	  penetrate	  and	  produce	  each	  other	  as	  a	  field	  of	  tension	  between	  different	  spatial	  logics	  and	  
where	  ‘sovereign	  power’	  and	  their	  subjects	  are	  produced	  and	  defined	  through	  a	  permanent	  (but	  unstable	  
and	  mutable)	  process	  of	  inclusive	  exclusion.	  Our	  claim	  will	  be	  that	  the	  camp	  should	  be	  read	  as	  a	  spazio-­‐
soglia	  driven	  by	  this	  tension,	  despite	  the	  inherent	  topographic	  spatialities	  that	  dominate	  any	  repressive	  
institution	  of	  this	  kind.	  In	  the	  second	  section,	  we	  briefly	  reflect	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  contemporary	  
historiographical	  literature	  on	  the	  Holocaust	  present	  the	  relationship	  between	  modernity,	  rationality,	  
and	  Nazism.	  The	  associated	  debate	  around	  the	  spatial	  nature	  of	  Auschwitz	  mirrors	  a	  broader	  controversy	  
about	  its	  centrality	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  the	  Third	  Reich.	  The	  following	  two	  sections	  
are	  an	  attempt	  to	  read	  ‘geographically’	  the	  entanglements	  between	  the	  camp,	  Nazi	  spatial	  planning,	  
bureaucratic	  rationalities	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  spazio-­‐soglia	  (roughly	  
translated	  as	  a	  spatial	  threshold)	  is	  central	  to	  this	  interpretation.	  The	  analysis	  of	  Auschwitz	  as	  a	  
metaphorical	  and	  real	  space	  of	  exception	  is	  an	  important	  starting	  point	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  
relationship	  between	  this	  latter	  notion	  and	  the	  calculative,	  cartographic,	  and	  topographical	  rationalities	  
of	  the	  camp.	  In	  ‘Auschwitz’,	  the	  ‘camp’	  proper	  was	  localized	  at	  the	  very	  edge	  of	  Oswiecim,	  a	  Polish	  town	  
annexed	  to	  the	  Reich,	  and	  consisted	  of	  a	  concentrational	  complex	  composed	  by	  three	  main	  lagers	  –	  the	  
concentration	  camp	  of	  Auschwitz	  I,	  the	  extermination	  camp	  of	  Auschwitz	  II	  (known	  as	  Birkenau)	  and	  the	  
slave	  labor	  camp	  of	  Auschwitz	  III	  (known	  as	  Buna-­‐Monowitz,	  where	  the	  IG	  Farben	  rubber	  plant	  was	  
located)	  –	  and	  complemented	  by	  an	  archipelago	  of	  almost	  fifty	  sub-­‐camps	  and	  satellite	  camps	  in	  the	  
surrounding	  region	  (Krakowski,	  1994).	  By	  first	  contextualizing	  Auschwitz	  within	  a	  broader	  regional	  
geography	  conceived	  by	  Nazi	  planning	  for	  that	  part	  of	  Poland,	  and	  subsequently	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  place	  
of	  the	  compound	  called	  ‘Mexico’	  within	  Birkenau	  as	  a	  key	  spazio-­‐soglia	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  these	  very	  
geographies,	  we	  hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  show	  how	  the	  topological	  spatialities	  of	  the	  camp-­‐as-­‐a-­‐threshold	  are	  
a	  constitutive	  element	  of	  the	  overall	  biopolitical	  Nazi	  project	  of	  ‘protective	  custody’	  and	  extermination.	  In	  
and	  on	  that	  threshold,	  in	  fact,	  the	  calculative	  and	  topographical	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Nazi	  project	  meet	  a	  
crucial	  limit	  and	  a	  real	  challenge,	  and	  open	  up	  to	  the	  irruption	  of	  the	  topological.	  	  
	  
THE	  CAMP-­‐AS-­‐A-­‐SPAZIO-­‐SOGLIA	  	  
In	  conceptualizing	  the	  state	  of	  exception,	  Agamben	  hints	  at	  the	  notion	  of	  soglia	  as	  a	  spatial	  condition	  and	  
as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  The	  space	  of	  indistinction	  that	  Agamben	  defines	  as	  a	  soglia	  is	  both	  
metaphorical	  and	  very	  real,	  and	  finds	  in	  the	  camp	  its	  most	  visible	  and	  violent	  expression.	  In	  his	  definition	  
of	  “the	  paradoxical	  status	  of	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  space	  of	  exception”	  (1998:	  169),	  he	  reads	  the	  camp	  precisely	  
through	  the	  workings	  of	  its	  spatialised	  soglia:	  
The	  camp	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  placed	  outside	  the	  normal	  juridical	  order,	  but	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  not	  simply	  and	  
external	  space.	  What	  is	  excluded	  in	  the	  camp	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  etymological	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  
“exception”	  (ex-­‐capere),	  taken	  outside,	  included	  through	  its	  own	  exclusion.	  […]	  The	  camp	  is	  thus	  the	  
structure	  in	  which	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  –	  the	  possibility	  of	  deciding	  on	  which	  founds	  sovereign	  power	  –	  
is	  realized	  normally.	  […]	  The	  camp	  is	  a	  hybrid	  of	  law	  and	  fact	  in	  which	  the	  two	  terms	  have	  become	  
indistinguishable.	  […]	  Whoever	  entered	  the	  camp	  moved	  into	  a	  zone	  of	  indistinction	  between	  outside	  
and	  inside,	  exception	  and	  rule,	  licit	  and	  illicit,	  in	  which	  the	  very	  concepts	  of	  subjective	  right	  and	  juridical	  
protection	  no	  longer	  made	  any	  sense	  (Agamben,	  1998:	  169-­‐170,	  original	  emphasis).	  
	  
The	  camp	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  soglia	  since	  it	  challenges	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  stable	  distinction	  
between	  an	  inside	  and	  an	  outside.	  The	  camp	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  geographical	  materialization	  of	  the	  
threshold	  of	  indistinction	  that	  comes	  to	  light	  when	  the	  norm	  and	  the	  exception	  tend	  to	  merge	  and	  
become	  indistinguishable.	  
if	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  camp	  consists	  in	  the	  materialization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  and	  in	  the	  subsequent	  
creation	  of	  a	  space	  in	  which	  bare	  life	  and	  the	  juridical	  rule	  enter	  into	  a	  threshold	  of	  indistinction,	  then	  we	  
must	  admit	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  virtually	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  camp	  every	  time	  such	  a	  structure	  is	  
created	  (Agamben,	  1998:	  174).	  
	  
When	  engaging	  with	  Carl	  Schmitt’s	  notion	  of	  sovereign	  exception	  in	  Homo	  Sacer,	  Agamben	  is	  very	  explicit	  
about	  this	  fundamental	  relationship	  between	  the	  soglia	  and	  the	  topological	  dimension	  of	  the	  camp:	  	  
The	  link	  between	  localization	  (Ortung)	  and	  ordering	  (Ordnung)	  constitutive	  of	  the	  “nomos	  of	  the	  earth”	  
[…]	  is	  therefore	  even	  more	  complex	  than	  Schmitt	  maintains	  and,	  at	  its	  center,	  contains	  a	  fundamental	  
ambiguity,	  an	  unlocalizable	  zone	  of	  indistinction	  or	  exception	  that,	  in	  the	  last	  analysis,	  necessarily	  acts	  
against	  it	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  its	  infinite	  dislocation.	  […]	  When	  our	  age	  tried	  to	  grant	  the	  unlocalizable	  a	  
permanent	  and	  visible	  localization,	  the	  result	  was	  the	  concentration	  camp.	  The	  camp	  –	  and	  not	  the	  
prison	  –	  is	  the	  space	  that	  corresponds	  to	  this	  originary	  structure	  of	  the	  nomos.	  […]	  As	  the	  absolute	  space	  
of	  exception,	  the	  camp	  is	  topologically	  different	  from	  a	  simple	  space	  of	  confinement.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  space	  
of	  exception,	  in	  which	  the	  link	  between	  localization	  and	  ordering	  is	  definitively	  broken,	  that	  has	  
determined	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  old	  “nomos	  of	  the	  earth”	  (Agamben,	  1998:	  19-­‐20;	  emphases	  added).	  
	  
	  According	  to	  this	  perspective,	  the	  camp-­‐as-­‐a-­‐soglia	  connotes	  a	  kind	  of	  spatiality,	  a	  realm	  of	  indistinction,	  
in	  which	  the	  borders	  between	  the	  inside	  and	  the	  outside	  are	  blurred	  and	  un-­‐mappable,	  and	  the	  
topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  come	  together.	  	  
Let’s	  take	  Agamben’s	  argument	  a	  bit	  further:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  represents	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  
metaphorical	  space	  where	  modern	  dichotomous	  categories	  (open/closed;	  internal/external;	  
friend/enemy;	  human/animal;	  norm/exception;	  sovereign/beast;	  etc.)	  are	  progressively	  replaced	  by	  a	  
process	  of	  inclusive	  exclusion	  in	  which	  those	  very	  categories	  tend	  to	  become	  indistinguishable,	  thereby	  
producing	  a	  condition	  in	  which	  any	  topographical	  classification	  and	  any	  radical	  spatial	  separation	  is	  
questioned.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Agamben	  identifies	  Auschwitz	  as	  an	  exemplary	  case	  of	  this	  camp-­‐
threshold	  –	  that	  is,	  a	  spatial	  structure	  which,	  at	  first	  sight,	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  most	  extraordinary	  example	  of	  
calculative	  rationality	  translated	  into	  space;	  a	  site	  that	  was	  conceived,	  planned,	  constructed,	  and	  
managed	  in	  order	  to	  ‘optimize’	  the	  (dark)	  relationship	  between	  (a	  lesser)	  people	  and	  space,	  as	  theorized	  
by	  Nazi	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  racial	  culture	  (see	  Ardvisson,	  2006;	  Fritzsche,	  2008;	  Pringler,	  2007).	  The	  
Auschwitz	  camp(s)	  are,	  in	  fact,	  often	  seen	  by	  both	  the	  academic	  literature	  and	  the	  popular	  imaginary	  as	  
the	  most	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  scientific	  organization	  of	  extermination,	  and	  as	  a	  machine	  for	  rational	  
mass	  murder:	  	  
The	  gas	  chambers	  of	  Belzec,	  Sobibor,	  and	  Treblinka	  […]	  preceded	  Auschwitz’s	  killing	  factories,	  as	  did	  
Chelmno	  and	  experiments	  under	  Arthur	  Nebe	  […].	  But	  these	  remained	  more	  or	  less	  ad	  hoc	  affairs.	  […]	  
Despite	  popular	  preoccupation	  with	  demonic	  Nazi	  efficiency	  or	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  upon	  technocracy	  or	  
bureaucratic	  terror	  in	  post-­‐war	  scholarship,	  none	  of	  these	  achieved	  the	  status	  of	  industrial	  operations.	  
While	  the	  SS	  displayed	  pretensions	  to	  science	  and	  industrial	  efficiency,	  the	  reality	  escaped	  them.	  […]	  
Auschwitz-­‐Birkenau	  was	  designed	  more	  carefully.	  […]	  Only	  trained	  architects,	  civil	  engineers,	  and	  a	  
considerable	  network	  of	  subcontractors	  could	  have	  supervised	  the	  erection	  of	  these	  buildings.	  Both	  to	  
the	  contemporaries	  and	  subsequent	  historians,	  they	  seemed	  unprecedented	  for	  their	  industrial,	  
bureaucratic	  efficiency	  (Allen,	  2002a:	  190).	  
	  
Wolfgang	  Sofsky,	  in	  The	  Order	  of	  Terror,	  a	  milestone	  in	  the	  reflection	  on	  the	  spatial	  dimension	  of	  the	  
Holocaust,	  is	  even	  more	  explicit	  on	  this	  aspect:	  
The	  geography	  of	  the	  modern	  concentration	  camp	  was	  not	  the	  product	  of	  historical	  development;	  it	  was	  
the	  result	  of	  an	  ideal	  plan	  that	  paid	  no	  heed	  to	  historical	  or	  natural	  conditions.	  […]	  The	  site	  was	  cleared,	  a	  
tabula	  rasa	  for	  erecting	  the	  camp	  according	  to	  strict	  design.	  Power	  occupied	  space	  and	  transformed	  it	  
totally.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  modernization	  of	  the	  concentration	  camp	  system	  from	  1936	  on	  expand	  the	  
functions	  of	  the	  camp;	  it	  also	  rationalized	  the	  order	  of	  space	  (1999:	  48).	  
	  
Sofsky’s	  analysis	  is	  strongly	  centred	  on	  the	  radical	  spatial	  separation	  of	  the	  Nazi	  camp,	  on	  the	  isolation	  of	  
its	  inmates,	  and	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  internal	  and	  external	  borders	  (1999:	  55-­‐64).	  A	  rigid	  separation	  
between	  the	  camp	  and	  its	  exterior	  was	  paralleled	  by	  an	  obsessive	  calculative	  management	  of	  the	  
interior.	  The	  internal	  spatialities	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  from	  the	  dormitories	  to	  the	  latrines	  –	  were	  planned	  in	  
detail	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  consumption	  and	  the	  use	  of	  space,	  and	  to	  maximise	  control	  and	  discipline:	  
“Activities	  were	  functionally	  dissociated;	  sites	  of	  work,	  accommodations,	  and	  places	  of	  execution	  were	  
rendered	  spatially	  separated.	  The	  camp	  enclosure	  was	  zoned,	  divided	  into	  regions”	  (1999:	  48).	  The	  
fundamental	  topographical	  nature	  of	  the	  camp	  is	  a	  pillar	  of	  Sofsky’s	  argument;	  nonetheless,	  it	  is	  his	  
description	  of	  the	  effective	  and	  potential	  breaches	  of	  this	  very	  order	  that	  we	  find	  of	  particular	  interest,	  
and	  it	  is	  precisely	  such	  breaches	  and	  their	  meaning	  that	  we	  intend	  to	  interrogate	  here	  (for	  a	  
phenomenological	  approach	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  camp	  see	  Mezga,	  1993).	  	  
	  
Now,	  if	  the	  ‘shrinking’	  of	  the	  internal	  spaces	  of	  the	  camp	  was	  a	  functional	  and	  symbolic	  counter-­‐
dimension	  to	  the	  expansive	  nature	  of	  German	  Lebensraum,	  then	  some	  key	  questions	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  In	  
which	  way	  was	  the	  camp	  the	  pivot	  of	  the	  Reich’s	  political	  and	  spatial	  economy,	  and,	  moreover,	  how	  did	  
such	  breaches	  represent	  a	  constant	  challenge	  to	  the	  camp’s	  rational	  topographies?	  How	  and	  why	  did	  the	  
camp	  incorporate	  both	  topographical	  and	  topological	  elements?	  Why	  is	  it	  important	  to	  investigate	  this	  
presumed	  penetration	  of	  the	  ‘topological’	  in	  the	  camp?	  To	  start	  engaging	  with	  these	  questions	  we	  need	  
first	  to	  contextualise	  our	  brief	  investigation	  within	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  the	  academic	  studies	  on	  the	  Third	  
Reich	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  As	  we	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  spatial	  ordering	  of	  the	  
camp	  must	  be	  framed	  within	  a	  more	  general	  reflection	  on	  the	  ‘topographical’	  and	  rational	  nature	  of	  the	  
Nazi	  project	  and	  the	  ‘topological’	  (and	  supposedly	  irrational)	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  its	  elements,	  a	  reflection	  
that	  has	  been	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  historiographical	  debate	  on	  the	  Holocaust	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  and	  that	  
continues	  today.	  	  
	  
AUSCHWITZ	  AND	  THE	  QUESTION	  OF	  MODERNITY	  
The	  representation	  of	  Auschwitz	  as	  the	  most	  vivid	  and	  cruel	  expression	  of	  the	  calculative	  rationality	  at	  
the	  core	  of	  the	  Nazi	  bureaucratic	  machine	  dedicated	  to	  extermination	  has	  been	  crucial	  in	  determining	  
the	  key	  role	  that	  the	  Auschwitz	  complex	  has	  played	  in	  the	  ‘functionalist’	  historiographical	  tradition.	  
Scholars	  in	  this	  tradition	  have	  seen	  the	  camp	  and,	  in	  general,	  the	  Holocaust,	  as	  extreme	  manifestations	  of	  
the	  technocratic	  and	  bureaucratic	  rationalities	  typical	  of	  a	  functionalist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Modern.	  The	  
functionalist	  school	  of	  thought,	  as	  it	  is	  known,	  includes	  some	  of	  the	  best	  renowned	  experts	  on	  the	  history	  
of	  the	  Holocaust	  (in	  primis	  Raul	  Hilberg	  and	  Götz	  Aly)	  but	  also	  key	  thinkers	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  century	  
(including	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  Zygmunt	  Bauman).	  This	  reading,	  however,	  is	  often	  set	  against	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘intentionalist’	  literature,	  which	  instead	  places	  a	  stronger	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  
its	  more	  radical	  variants.	  According	  to	  historian	  Yehuda	  Bauer,	  “the	  functionalist	  school	  traced	  the	  
development	  toward	  murder	  through	  the	  history	  of	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  structures	  of	  German	  
society	  […]	  Racism	  and	  antisemitism	  were	  in	  the	  background,	  but	  by	  themselves	  would	  not	  have	  led	  to	  
the	  so-­‐called	  Final	  Solution.	  [...]	  The	  intentionalist	  school	  put	  the	  primary	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ideology-­‐
ridden	  dictatorship,	  which	  intended	  to	  establish	  a	  racist	  utopia	  and	  which	  saw	  in	  the	  Jews	  a	  prime	  target	  
for	  physical	  elimination”	  (2001:	  29).	  	  
	  	  
That	  calculative	  rationality	  was	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  technocratic	  and	  bureaucratic	  practices	  of	  
the	  Third	  Reich	  is	  beyond	  doubt.	  It	  is	  enough	  to	  recall	  the	  extraordinary	  effort	  of	  the	  Nazi	  apparatus	  in	  
estimating	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  the	  Jewish	  population	  (Aly	  and	  Roth,	  2004:	  56-­‐93),	  first	  in	  Germany	  (a	  census	  
took	  place	  in	  June	  1933),	  and	  subsequently	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe;	  an	  effort	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  calculation	  
that	  there	  existed	  about	  11	  million	  Jews	  that	  were	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  Final	  Solution	  (Arad	  et	  al.,	  
1999:	  254).	  During	  the	  infamous	  Wannsee	  conference	  held	  in	  January	  1942,	  the	  crucial	  (for	  the	  Nazis)	  
relationship	  between	  calculation	  and	  classification	  (of	  people)	  that	  had	  been	  placed	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  
public	  debate	  since	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  Nuremberg	  Laws	  in	  1935	  was	  taken	  to	  its	  extreme	  
consequences:	  in	  order	  to	  quantify	  and	  solve	  the	  ‘Jewish	  question’	  it	  was	  necessary	  first	  to	  clarify	  not	  
only	  ‘who	  was	  a	  Jew’,	  but	  also	  ‘how	  Jewish	  each	  individual	  might	  be’.	  The	  protocols	  of	  the	  Conference	  
illustrate	  the	  commitment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Nazi	  elite	  to	  the	  definition,	  to	  the	  most	  minute	  detail,	  of	  the	  
status	  –	  that	  is,	  of	  the	  ‘fate’	  –	  of	  the	  Mischlinge,	  the	  Jews	  of	  ‘mixed	  race’	  (1999:	  257-­‐259).	  This	  should	  not	  
come	  as	  a	  surprise,	  since	  this	  calculation/classification	  soon	  became	  a	  key	  biopolitical	  terrain	  in	  the	  
production	  of	  the	  new	  German	  nation	  led	  by	  a	  new	  master	  race	  (in	  the	  making).	  The	  threshold	  between	  
different	  categories	  of	  ‘Jewishness’	  was	  fundamental	  in	  the	  mapping	  out	  of	  a	  racial	  cartography	  aimed	  at	  
drawing	  the	  new	  cultural	  geographies	  of	  Europe,	  as	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Reichssippenamt	  
(Reich	  Kinship	  Office),	  an	  office	  that	  was	  entirely	  dedicated	  to	  the	  drawing	  of	  these	  imagined	  (and	  
mobile)	  borderlines	  between	  the	  Aryan	  race	  and	  the	  ‘other’,	  ‘inferior’,	  races	  (Hertz,	  1997;	  Pegelow,	  
2006).	  Regrettably,	  this	  ‘calculative	  trap’	  extended	  its	  legacy	  well	  beyond	  the	  years	  of	  the	  Holocaust:	  the	  
calculation	  of	  the	  number	  of	  victims	  was	  central	  to	  the	  discussion	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  Nurnberg	  
trials	  (Seltzer,	  1998),	  but	  has	  also	  been	  used	  more	  recently	  by	  the	  negationist	  literature	  (see	  the	  
discussion	  in	  Van	  Pelt,	  2002:	  106-­‐136;	  Zimmerman,	  2004).	  	  
	  
What	  is	  more	  important	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  our	  argument,	  however,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  discussion	  around	  the	  
relationship	  between	  modern	  rationalities	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  has	  gone	  beyond	  the	  historiographical	  
debate,	  to	  be	  comprised	  within	  a	  more	  general	  philosophical	  critique	  of	  modernity.	  Zygmunt	  Bauman’s	  
Modernity	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  is	  a	  particularly	  important	  contribution	  to	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  since	  it	  
presents	  the	  Holocaust	  as	  an	  event	  that	  occurred	  not	  despite	  modernity,	  but	  rather	  because	  of	  
modernity	  itself:	  
Once	  the	  hope	  to	  contain	  the	  Holocaust	  experience	  in	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  malfunction	  
(modernity	  incapable	  of	  suppressing	  the	  essentially	  alien	  factors	  of	  irrationality,	  civilizing	  pressures	  failing	  
to	  subdue	  emotional	  and	  violent	  derives,	  socialization	  going	  awry	  and	  hence	  unable	  to	  produce	  the	  
needed	  volume	  of	  moral	  motivations)	  has	  been	  dashed,	  one	  can	  be	  easily	  tempted	  to	  try	  the	  ‘obvious’	  
exit	  from	  the	  theoretical	  impasse;	  to	  proclaim	  the	  Holocaust	  a	  ‘paradigm’	  of	  modern	  civilization,	  its	  
‘natural’,	  ‘normal’	  (who	  knows	  –	  perhaps	  also	  common)	  product,	  its	  ‘historical	  tendency’.	  In	  this	  version,	  
the	  Holocaust	  would	  be	  promoted	  to	  the	  status	  of	  truth	  of	  modernity	  (rather	  than	  recognized	  as	  a	  
possibility	  that	  modernity	  contains)	  (1989:5-­‐6)	  
	  
Similarly,	  Stuart	  Elden	  reads	  Nazi	  rationalities	  as	  expressions	  of	  a	  more	  general	  modern	  calculative	  
rationality,	  also	  in	  light	  of	  Heidegger’s	  and	  Foucault’s	  critical	  reflections	  (Elden,	  2003;	  2006a;	  2006b:	  in	  
particular	  147-­‐169;	  2007).	  According	  to	  Elden,	  who	  deliberately	  decides	  not	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  discussion	  
of	  Heidegger’s	  implication	  in	  the	  Nazi	  project	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Levinas,	  [1934]	  1990),	  the	  question	  is	  an	  
ontological	  one	  (that	  is,	  philosophical),	  and	  secondarily,	  ‘genealogical’	  (and	  thus	  historical):	  
…the	  question	  goes	  beyond	  merely	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  techniques	  that	  made	  particular	  actions	  
possible.	  Rather	  the	  question	  is	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  techniques	  themselves,	  a	  
deeper	  problematic	  that	  seeks	  to	  account	  for	  the	  technical,	  rational,	  scientific	  mindset	  itself.	  […]	  this	  is	  
not	  merely	  a	  question	  of	  epistemology,	  but,	  precisely	  because	  it	  enquires	  into	  how	  ‘what	  is’	  is,	  a	  question	  
of	  ontology	  […]	  This	  is	  why	  Heidegger	  is	  useful	  because	  he	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  
calculation	  displayed	  in	  Nazism	  showcases	  a	  much	  broader	  calculative	  understanding	  of	  the	  world,	  a	  
calculative	  understanding	  of	  the	  political.	  This	  ontological	  determination	  necessarily	  exceeds	  any	  ontic	  
politics.	  This	  particular	  grasp	  of	  the	  political	  can	  be	  approached	  through	  a	  historical	  analysis,	  a	  historical	  
ontology	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  calculation	  (2006a:	  754,	  766).	  
	  
The	  line	  of	  thought	  that,	  through	  the	  notion	  of	  calculative	  rationality,	  links	  Nazism	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  to	  
modernity,	  however,	  has	  been	  widely	  criticised	  from	  within	  the	  historiographical	  debate,	  especially	  for	  
what	  is	  perceived	  as	  the	  exaggerated	  role	  assigned	  to	  the	  bureaucratic	  and	  rational	  planning	  of	  the	  
Holocaust	  (for	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  functionalist	  literature	  see	  Bauer	  (2001:	  68-­‐92),	  also	  Stone	  (2003:	  239-­‐
261).	  From	  the	  1980s	  onwards,	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  scholarship	  has	  highlighted	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  series	  of	  
important	  ‘grey	  zones’	  and	  overlaps	  between	  the	  functionalist	  and	  the	  intentionalist	  approaches,	  that	  is,	  
between	  the	  roles	  assigned	  by	  the	  literature	  to	  technocratic	  rationality	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  virulent	  
ideology	  on	  the	  other.	  More	  specifically,	  a	  new	  stream	  of	  literature	  has	  put	  significant	  effort	  into	  the	  
investigation	  of	  the	  presumed	  ‘neutrality’	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  in	  the	  Third	  Reich,	  showing	  how	  the	  
technicians	  and	  engineers	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  actual	  realisation	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  were	  far	  from	  mere	  
‘desk-­‐killers’;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  they	  were	  often	  ‘modernisers’	  acting	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  new	  world	  vision	  
entirely	  consistent	  with	  Nazi	  ideology	  (see	  Allen,	  2002b;	  Aly	  and	  Heim,	  2003;	  Aly	  and	  Roth,	  2004;	  Katz,	  
2005).	  In	  his	  path-­‐breaking	  work	  entitled	  Reactionary	  Modernism,	  Jeffrey	  Herf	  describes	  very	  
convincingly	  the	  ambiguous	  relationship	  that	  bound	  the	  Third	  Reich	  technocracy	  to	  the	  mythological	  and	  
irrational	  ideology	  of	  the	  party	  elite:	  
Technology	  would	  have	  to	  be	  legitimated	  without	  succumbing	  to	  Enlightenment	  rationality.	  Just	  like	  the	  
literati,	  the	  engineers	  wanted	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  technological	  advance	  was	  compatible	  with	  German	  
nationalism’s	  revolt	  against	  positivism.	  […]	  The	  development	  of	  capitalism	  and	  its	  attendant	  commercial	  
culture	  threatened	  the	  precapitalist,	  nonutilitarian	  Aryan	  traditions	  of	  German	  culture	  and	  philosophy,	  
and	  thus	  threatened	  the	  basis	  for	  further	  technological	  advance	  as	  well.	  The	  antimodernist	  rhetoric	  of	  
National	  Socialism	  promised	  to	  preserve	  this	  precapitalist	  culture	  and	  paradoxically	  enhanced	  further	  
technological	  development.	  […]	  Germany’s	  illiberal,	  feudal	  traditions	  would	  enhance	  technical	  advance	  
(1984:	  155,	  159).	  
	  
Within	  the	  broader	  discussion	  on	  the	  Holocaust,	  another	  line	  of	  thought,	  equally	  relevant	  for	  our	  
argument,	  has	  been	  recently	  developed	  by	  Dan	  Stone,	  whose	  analysis	  is	  centred	  on	  questions	  of	  violence	  
and	  the	  irrational	  dimension	  of	  the	  massacres	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  Nazis.	  In	  a	  recent	  book	  (2006),	  while	  
engaging	  with	  a	  series	  of	  different	  theoretical	  approaches	  –	  from	  Malinowski’s	  concept	  of	  the	  magic	  (31-­‐
52)	  to	  Bataille’s	  notion	  of	  ‘excess	  of	  energy’	  (69-­‐92),	  and	  even	  Callois’	  reflection	  on	  the	  carnevalesque	  
and	  the	  related	  literature	  on	  violence	  as	  transgression	  (196-­‐216)	  –	  he	  claims	  that	  the	  artificial	  dichotomy	  
between	  functionalist	  and	  intentionalist	  interpretations	  must	  be	  overcome:	  
[…]	  the	  historiographical	  trend	  towards	  dismissing	  the	  supposedly	  abstract	  inquiry	  into	  modernity	  should	  
be	  treated	  with	  caution,	  just	  as	  the	  trend	  towards	  recognising	  violence	  and	  the	  experiences	  of	  its	  victims	  
is	  to	  be	  welcomed.	  For	  the	  violence	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  in	  opposition	  to	  modernity.	  The	  question	  should	  
not	  be	  whether	  violence	  emerged	  from	  rational	  thinking	  (‘modernity’)	  of	  irrationality	  (‘barbarism’);	  
rather	  it	  should	  be	  about	  determining	  precisely	  how	  the	  conjunction	  of	  rationalised	  society	  and	  violent	  
passions	  […]	  erupts	  at	  certain	  moments	  into	  so	  apocalyptic	  a	  force	  (2006:	  12).	  
	  
An	  important	  consequence	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  central	  role	  of	  Auschwitz	  in	  the	  political	  economy	  
of	  the	  Final	  Solution	  is	  put	  into	  question.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  tends	  to	  privilege	  a	  more	  complex	  and	  
articulated	  reading	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  of	  extermination,	  a	  regime	  in	  which	  Auschwitz	  and	  the	  camps	  
related	  to	  the	  Reinhard	  Operation	  (Belzec,	  Sobibor	  and	  Treblinka)	  coexisted	  with	  less	  organised	  and	  less	  
technocentric	  forms	  of	  mass	  of	  murder;	  a	  good	  example	  being	  the	  mass	  shootings	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  
Einsatzgruppen	  during	  the	  occupation	  of	  Russian,	  Ukrainian	  and	  Baltic	  territories	  or	  the	  castle-­‐turned-­‐
into-­‐camp	  in	  Chelmno.	  	  
	  
Agamben’s	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  soglia	  can	  therefore	  be	  helpful	  in	  challenging	  some	  of	  the	  dichotomies	  
(bureaucracy	  versus	  ideology;	  rationality	  versus	  violence;	  resistance	  versus	  passivity)	  that	  have	  fed	  into	  
mainstream	  historiographical	  research	  on	  the	  Holocaust.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  thus	  focus	  on	  the	  
Auschwitz	  complex	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  notion	  of	  camp-­‐as-­‐spazio-­‐soglia	  à	  la	  Agamben	  
can	  help	  in	  challenging	  the	  limits	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  its	  rational	  topographies.	  In	  particular,	  we	  shall	  
argue	  that,	  despite	  its	  self-­‐evident	  topographical	  layout,	  Auschwitz	  encompassed	  also	  a	  set	  of	  
‘topological’	  rationalities,	  in	  both	  its	  external	  (as	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  spatialisation	  of	  Nazi	  policies	  and	  
politics)	  and	  internal	  organization.	  	  
	  
AUSCHWITZ	  AS	  A	  SPATIAL	  THRESHOLD	  
If	  we	  were	  to	  engage	  with	  Agamben’s	  claim	  that	  the	  camp	  was	  more	  than	  a	  topographical	  space	  of	  
reclusion	  and	  extermination	  (determined	  by	  a	  set	  of	  radical	  dichotomies	  of	  the	  inside/outside	  kind),	  we	  
need	  to	  embrace	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  geographies	  of	  Auschwitz	  that	  is	  able	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  by	  
now	  well	  established	  readings	  of	  its	  calculative	  rationalities	  and	  related	  topographies.	  The	  representation	  
of	  Auschwitz	  and	  of	  the	  broader	  geographies	  of	  the	  Nazi	  camps	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  mere	  cartographic	  
rationality	  tells	  us,	  in	  fact,	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  As	  noted	  by	  Charlesworth,	  the	  system	  of	  Nazi	  camps	  was	  
less	  an	  isotropic	  space	  deprived	  of	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  surroundings	  geographies,	  than	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
project	  that	  attempted	  to	  realise	  in	  the	  camp	  a	  (tragic)	  experimental	  combination	  of	  radical	  
topographical	  rationalities	  and	  a	  set	  of	  non-­‐calculative	  spatialities:	  	  
	  
We	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  the	  death	  and	  concentration	  camps	  as	  built	  on	  isotropic	  surface	  […].	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  
best	  exemplified	  in	  those	  aerial	  shots	  of	  Birkenau	  taken	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Air	  Force	  at	  the	  liberation	  […].	  Here	  
we	  see	  a	  grid	  pattern	  of	  rows	  of	  black	  huts,	  grids	  of	  streets	  and	  fences,	  with	  regularly	  spaced	  
watchtowers	  in	  the	  snow.	  The	  way	  sites	  have	  been	  presented	  to	  us	  cartographically	  has	  confirmed	  this	  
view.	  Black	  dots	  or	  lines	  on	  white	  papers	  characterize	  such	  cartographic	  representations	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  
sites	  (2004a:	  218).	  
	  It	  is	  not	  our	  intention	  to	  deny	  the	  prominence	  of	  topographical	  elements	  in	  the	  spatialities	  of	  this	  camp,	  
or	  of	  any	  camp;	  however,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  Nazi-­‐camp	  exceeded	  these	  very	  rationalities	  
and	  that	  its	  biopolitical	  machine	  relied	  also	  on	  a	  realm	  of	  indistinction	  –	  a	  threshold	  where	  the	  
topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  came	  together.	  We	  are	  here	  presented	  with	  a	  sort	  of	  spatial	  paradox	  of	  
great	  interest:	  the	  camp	  was,	  at	  one	  time,	  the	  epitome	  of	  modern	  calculative	  rationality	  translated	  into	  
practice	  and	  a	  topological	  space,	  where	  life	  collapsed	  into	  politics,	  where	  zoë	  and	  bios,	  human	  being	  and	  
homo	  sacer,	  citizen	  and	  bandit	  came	  together	  and	  became	  indistinguishable	  (Agamben,	  1998:	  166-­‐180).	  
What	  is	  more	  important	  –	  and	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	  core	  of	  our	  geographical	  argument	  –	  is	  that	  the	  
topological	  in/of	  the	  camp	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  sort	  of	  metaphorical	  dimension;	  instead,	  it	  translated	  into	  
real	  material	  spaces	  and	  a	  related	  set	  of	  practices.	  It	  might	  thus	  be	  useful	  to	  confront	  this	  hypothesis	  with	  
two	  examples	  of	  specific	  spatialities	  around	  which	  the	  biopolitical	  camp-­‐machine	  gravitated:	  first,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Auschwitz	  complex	  and	  the	  city	  of	  Oswiecim-­‐Auschwitz,	  and	  between	  these	  
two	  and	  the	  broader	  Nazi	  spatial	  politics	  for	  that	  part	  of	  Europe;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  ambiguous	  status	  of	  
Birkenau	  III,	  known	  by	  the	  inmates	  as	  ‘Mexico’,	  a	  real	  and	  imagined	  space	  that	  opened	  up	  a	  topological	  
realm	  in	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  concentrational	  system	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich.	  	  
	  
The	  Camp,	  The	  City,	  The	  Plan	  
In	  order	  to	  question	  the	  reading	  of	  Auschwitz	  as	  an	  absolute	  topographical	  and	  isolated	  space	  merely	  
driven	  by	  calculative	  rationality,	  its	  spatialities	  must	  be	  contextualised	  within	  the	  broader	  Nazi	  spatial	  
imaginary,	  centred	  as	  it	  was	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  Lebensraum	  (see	  Clarke	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Herwig,	  1999;	  Olwig,	  
2002;	  Smith,	  1980).	  The	  organisation	  of	  the	  Final	  Solution,	  that	  found	  its	  most	  dramatic	  symbolic	  and	  
functional	  expression	  in	  Auschwitz,	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  process	  that	  developed	  through	  multiple	  phases	  and	  
articulated	  according	  to	  a	  specific	  geography	  of	  events,	  plans,	  and	  practices.	  These	  events,	  plans,	  and	  
practices	  aimed	  at	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  greater	  German	  space	  exempt	  from	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  Jewish	  
population	  (Browning,	  2004):	  from	  the	  expulsion	  of	  the	  Jews	  from	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  Reich	  towards	  
the	  General	  Government,	  to	  the	  successive	  attempted	  integration	  of	  the	  General	  Government	  into	  a	  
judenfrei	  German	  space	  thanks	  to	  the	  efforts	  and	  the	  will	  of	  its	  governor	  Hans	  Frank	  (see	  Housden,	  2004;	  
also	  Aly	  and	  Heim,	  2002;	  Burleigh,	  2001);	  from	  the	  widespread	  discussion	  about	  an	  extra-­‐European	  final	  
‘destination’	  for	  the	  expelled	  European	  Jews	  (the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  the	  Philippines	  and	  Australia,	  even	  
Alaska,	  were	  taken	  into	  consideration…)	  to	  the	  inconclusive	  Evian	  Conference	  on	  the	  same	  topic	  
organised	  by	  President	  Roosevelt	  in	  1938	  to	  the	  grand	  project	  for	  the	  deportation	  of	  all	  Jews	  to	  
Madagascar	  (Jennings,	  2007);	  from	  Operation	  Barbarossa,	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  German	  Lebensraum	  
towards	  the	  East,	  through	  the	  colonisation	  of	  the	  Ukraine	  (Lower,	  2005).	  What	  will	  eventually	  become	  
the	  most	  infamous	  extermination	  camp	  was	  thus	  not	  located	  in	  a	  void;	  quite	  the	  contrary:	  it	  was	  fully	  
embedded	  within	  the	  broader	  spatialities	  and	  territorialities	  that	  were	  implemented	  by	  the	  Nazi	  imperial	  
project.	  As	  argued	  by	  Sybille	  Steinbacher,	  the	  Nazi	  plans	  for	  Auschwitz	  were	  strictly	  related	  to	  the	  new	  
role	  of	  the	  General	  Government	  as	  a	  space	  fully	  integrated	  into	  the	  German	  Lebensraum,	  and	  
accelerated	  after	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  infamous	  decision	  to	  localise	  a	  new	  IG	  Farben	  
plant	  in	  the	  area	  (2005:	  62-­‐78).	  Robert	  Van	  Pelt’s	  (1994;	  also,	  Dwork	  and	  Van	  Pelt,	  1996)	  work	  on	  
Auschwitz	  is	  very	  useful	  in	  understanding	  the	  camp’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  broader	  geographies	  of	  the	  
Third	  Reich:	  
The	  first	  time	  I	  visited	  Auschwitz	  I	  was	  surprised	  by	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  a	  centre	  of	  extermination	  and	  a	  
major	  town.	  I	  had	  seen	  Lanzmann’s	  film	  Shoah	  and	  remembered	  its	  depiction	  of	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  
death	  camps	  of	  Treblinka	  and	  Sobibor,	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  forest	  that	  surrounded	  them.	  […]	  I	  began	  to	  
investigate	  the	  archives	  in	  Poland	  and	  I	  found	  that	  not	  only	  was	  the	  camp	  at	  Auschwitz	  built	  right	  next	  to	  
an	  existing	  town,	  but	  this	  very	  town	  had	  been	  designated	  as	  a	  centre	  of	  growth	  by	  the	  same	  men	  who	  
had	  ordered	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  camp.	  […]	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  mythification	  of	  Auschwitz	  […]	  
had	  blinded	  me	  to	  a	  more	  complex	  reality	  in	  which	  seemingly	  opposite	  things	  –	  the	  design	  for	  utopia	  and	  
the	  reality	  of	  dystopia	  –	  existed	  side	  by	  side	  (1994:	  94).	  
	  
The	  enlargement	  of	  the	  concentration	  camp	  took	  place,	  in	  fact,	  together	  with	  the	  planning	  of	  the	  new	  
city,	  and	  these	  two	  parallel	  processes	  were	  driven	  by	  a	  very	  similar	  rationality.	  The	  creation	  of	  Auschwitz	  
as	  a	  ‘company	  town’	  (Hayes	  2003:331)	  must	  therefore	  be	  contextualised	  within	  broader	  Nazi	  regional	  
planning	  –	  that	  is,	  within	  the	  spatial	  and	  territorial	  realisation	  of	  a	  millennial	  Empire	  for	  the	  Third	  Reich,	  
as	  “a	  Faustian	  project	  to	  create	  a	  German	  paradise	  amid	  Polish	  perdition”	  (Van	  Pelt,	  1994:	  94).	  Van	  Pelt	  
and	  Dwork	  show	  how	  the	  prominence	  of	  Auschwitz	  –	  both	  as	  a	  city	  and	  as	  a	  concentration	  camp	  and,	  
eventually,	  as	  an	  extermination	  camp	  –	  was	  part	  of	  a	  more	  general	  resettlement	  plan	  that	  went	  together	  
the	  expansion	  of	  the	  German	  Lebensraum	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  in	  primis	  Poland	  (Housden,	  2004;	  
Rössler,	  2001).	  Van	  Pelt	  also	  rightly	  links	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  newly	  conceived	  German	  and	  Aryan	  
greater	  space	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  European	  Jewry,	  and	  identifies	  Himmler	  as	  “The	  man	  who	  was	  chiefly	  
responsible	  for	  transforming	  the	  ideology	  and	  the	  resettlement	  into	  practical	  policy	  […]	  Himmler’s	  use	  of	  
the	  word	  brick	  [in	  one	  of	  his	  famous	  speeches]	  had	  both	  a	  metaphorical	  and	  a	  literal	  sense.	  The	  German	  
concentration	  camps,	  which	  Himmler	  controlled	  as	  Reichsführer-­‐SS,	  had	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  taken	  on	  a	  key	  
role	  in	  the	  German	  production	  of	  building	  materials”	  (1994:	  99,	  104-­‐105).	  	  
	  
This	  process	  of	  realizing	  a	  city-­‐cum-­‐camp	  was	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  geography	  and	  spatial	  
science	  in	  Germany	  (Mullin,	  1981;	  Rössler,	  2001),	  a	  process	  in	  which	  a	  key	  role	  was	  played	  by	  agronomist	  
Konrad	  Meyer	  –	  head	  of	  the	  Reichskommissars	  für	  die	  Festigung	  deutschen	  Volkstums	  (RKF,	  the	  Reich	  
Working	  Party	  on	  Regional	  Planning)	  from	  1936	  to	  1940	  (Aly	  and	  Heim,	  2002:	  93-­‐98)	  and	  in	  1941	  chief	  
editor	  of	  the	  renowned	  Generalplan	  Ost	  (253-­‐282)	  –	  and	  geographer	  Walter	  Christaller,	  recruited	  by	  
Meyer	  to	  give	  a	  (geographical)	  contribution	  to	  Himmler’s	  grand	  plans.	  Christaller’s	  deep	  and	  direct	  
involvement	  in	  this	  enterprise	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  “was	  simultaneously	  employed	  on	  the	  staff	  
of	  the	  Main	  Office	  for	  Planning	  and	  the	  Soil,	  an	  agency	  within	  Himmler’s	  Reich	  Commissariat	  for	  the	  
Strengthening	  of	  Ethnic	  Germandom”	  (Rössler	  1989:	  427).	  According	  to	  Van	  Pelt,	  Meyer	  convinced	  
Himmler	  “that	  a	  speedy	  Germanisation	  of	  the	  area	  around	  Auschwitz	  was	  of	  the	  highest	  priority”	  in	  order	  
to	  make	  of	  Auschwitz	  “a	  paradigm	  of	  the	  settlement	  in	  the	  East”	  (1994:	  106;	  see	  also	  Lower,	  2005).	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  topographical	  rationalities	  that	  linked	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  camp	  complex	  to	  a	  broader	  
regional	  context	  provide	  only	  a	  partial	  explanation.	  Regional	  and	  urban	  planning	  in	  the	  Third	  Reich	  was,	  
in	  fact,	  not	  depleted	  of	  ‘irrational’	  ideological	  elements;	  quite	  the	  contrary	  (Renton,	  2001).	  The	  figure	  of	  
Gottfried	  Feder,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  German	  Worker’s	  Party	  and	  a	  key	  player	  in	  Nazi	  urban	  
planning,	  is	  a	  revealing	  example	  of	  this	  tension	  between	  the	  two	  spatial	  logics.	  While	  occupying	  the	  Chair	  
of	  Urban	  Design	  at	  the	  Technische	  Universität	  Berlin,	  he	  developed	  a	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  urban	  
design	  which,	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war,	  matched	  to	  some	  extent	  Himmler’s	  vision	  of	  urban	  
rearticulation	  of	  the	  annexed	  territories	  (Schenk	  and	  Bromley,	  2003;	  also,	  Taylor,	  1974).	  Feder	  embodied	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  radical	  interpretations	  of	  the	  calculative	  rationality	  of	  the	  day,	  a	  rationality	  that	  
constituted	  the	  domain	  of	  Nazi	  urban	  and	  regional	  planning,	  especially	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  theorise	  the	  
‘ideal’	  size	  of	  a	  Nazi	  city	  (20,000	  inhabitants),	  its	  economic	  and	  productive	  structures,	  and	  its	  very	  
hierarchical	  and	  holistic	  articulation	  based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  nested	  scales	  (household,	  block,	  cell,	  local	  group,	  
district,	  province,	  etc.).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  his	  work	  was	  largely	  inspired	  by	  a	  sort	  nostalgic	  drive	  
towards	  an	  idealised	  medieval	  and	  pre-­‐modern	  Germany	  (see	  Brüggemeier	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  A	  similar	  tension	  
can	  be	  identified	  in	  Christaller:	  
It	  was	  Christaller	  […]	  who	  informed	  Himmler	  of	  the	  proper	  relation	  between	  a	  town	  and	  the	  surrounding	  
countryside.	  Like	  so	  many	  others	  in	  Hitler’s	  Reich,	  Christaller	  was	  inspired	  by	  the	  medieval	  settlement	  
pattern	  in	  which	  urban	  and	  rural	  life	  had	  been	  balanced	  in	  healthy	  symbiosis.	  The	  industrial	  revolution	  
had	  destroyed	  that	  harmony,	  the	  countryside	  was	  no	  longer	  valued	  by	  the	  town,	  and	  the	  latter	  lost	  its	  
identity	  as	  a	  result	  (Van	  Pelt	  and	  Dwork	  1996:	  240).	  
	  
This	  very	  tension/contradiction	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  Auschwitz	  itself,	  as	  expressed	  by	  
Hans	  Stosberg’s	  plan	  in	  1941	  that	  entered	  into	  a	  conflictual	  relationship	  with	  the	  expansion	  project	  of	  the	  
SS	  settlement	  proposed	  by	  (SS)	  architect	  Lothar	  Hartjenstein:	  “the	  two	  parties	  argued	  for	  almost	  a	  year,	  
pushing	  the	  border	  between	  the	  city	  and	  the	  camp	  up	  and	  down	  between	  the	  proposed	  avenue	  and	  the	  
perimeter	  of	  the	  camp”	  (Van	  Pelt,	  1994:	  112,	  emphasis	  added).	  It	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  any	  
description	  of	  the	  camp	  based	  on	  dichotomous	  categories	  that	  imagine	  a	  radical	  inside	  (the	  camp(s)	  of	  
Auschwitz)	  and	  a	  radical	  outside	  (the	  town	  of	  Oswiecim-­‐Auschwitz)	  is	  not	  only	  difficult	  to	  sustain,	  but	  also	  
overlooks	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  mobile	  threshold	  between	  the	  two	  and	  its	  related	  geographies	  that	  were	  
essential	  in	  the	  production	  of	  these	  experimental	  racialised	  spatialities.	  The	  unstable	  nature	  of	  the	  
topographical	  borders	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  that	  for	  this	  very	  reason	  were	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  many	  ritualised	  and	  
spectacularised	  spatial	  practices	  (Sofsky,	  1999)	  –	  in	  fact	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  production	  not	  only	  of	  
the	  victims,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  perpetrators.	  Hoess’	  daily	  whereabouts	  in	  Auschwitz	  are	  a	  very	  good	  example	  
of	  the	  functioning	  of	  this	  mobile	  threshold	  that	  became,	  in	  our	  view,	  a	  defining	  element	  of	  the	  very	  
spatialities	  of	  the	  camp:	  
As	  he	  stepped	  from	  his	  back	  garden	  at	  his	  home	  in	  Auschwitz,	  Hoess	  [the	  infamous	  camp	  commandant	  at	  
Auschwitz]	  crossed	  the	  boundary	  between	  home	  and	  work.	  On	  the	  one	  side	  of	  the	  line	  he	  was	  a	  family	  
man,	  who	  played	  with	  his	  children	  and	  swam	  with	  them	  in	  the	  Sola	  River	  just	  across	  the	  road.	  On	  the	  
other	  side	  he	  walked	  a	  few	  steps	  to	  his	  office	  and	  a	  further	  few	  to	  the	  gas	  chambers.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
day,	  he	  would	  cross	  the	  line	  back	  to	  the	  bosom	  of	  his	  family.	  […]	  Tragedy	  on	  the	  doorstep	  could	  be	  
ignored	  for	  across	  the	  threshold	  a	  job	  had	  to	  be	  done	  to	  protect	  the	  bourgeois	  family	  from	  the	  world,	  
from	  the	  Other,	  from	  the	  Jew	  (Charlesworth,	  2004a:	  238-­‐239,	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  ‘spatial	  ambiguity’	  of	  Auschwitz	  went	  well	  beyond	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
camp(s)	  and	  the	  city,	  and	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  broader	  surrounding	  territories,	  
through	  both	  the	  eviction	  and	  the	  massive	  displacement	  of	  the	  Polish	  population	  living	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  true	  univers	  concentrationnaire;	  that	  is,	  an	  articulated	  system	  of	  sub-­‐camps,	  villages	  and	  
farms.	  Accordingly,	  from	  June	  1940,	  the	  local	  administration	  (in	  German	  hands)	  began	  to	  implement	  the	  
forced	  displacement	  and	  deportation	  of	  the	  resident	  population	  (Lasik	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  The	  40-­‐square-­‐km	  
area	  in	  question	  	  
was	  organized	  as	  a	  separate	  administrative	  district	  (Amtsbezirk),	  exempt	  from	  civilian	  administration.	  
This	  district	  was	  administered	  by	  the	  camp	  commandant	  as	  Amtskommissar.	  His	  prerogatives	  comprised	  
all	  civil-­‐administrative	  and	  police	  affairs	  within	  the	  district	  he	  administered,	  including	  civil	  registry	  
matters.	  In	  this	  regard,	  a	  civil	  registry	  office	  (Standesamt)	  was	  established	  in	  the	  camp	  (ibid,	  73-­‐74:	  
emphasis	  added).	  	  
	  
This	  territorial	  articulation	  thus	  created	  a	  zone	  of	  indistinction	  between	  the	  camp	  and	  the	  city,	  a	  sort	  of	  
novel	  spazio-­‐soglia.	  The	  camp	  functionally	  exceeded	  its	  own	  topographies	  –	  marked	  as	  they	  were	  by	  the	  
violent	  logic	  of	  the	  barbed	  wire	  (Mezga,	  1990;	  Charlesworth,	  1994)	  –	  and	  projected	  its	  sovereignty	  onto	  
the	  surrounding	  territories	  by	  creating	  a	  large	  space	  of	  exception	  exempt	  from	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  
civilian/civic	  administration.	  Remarkably,	  the	  civic	  registry	  –	  the	  ‘catalogue’	  of	  people	  dead	  or	  alive,	  and	  
the	  primary	  source	  of	  Nazi	  calculative	  rationality	  –	  was	  located	  inside	  the	  camp.	  In	  the	  surrounding	  
‘Auschwitzed’	  region,	  a	  sort	  of	  Christallerian	  rationality	  guided	  Nazi	  spatial	  planning	  towards	  the	  
realisation	  of	  an	  archipelago	  of	  about	  fifty	  secondary	  camps	  to	  which	  diversified	  and	  localised	  functions	  
were	  assigned	  –	  from	  agriculture	  to	  industrial	  production	  –	  in	  the	  greater	  political	  economy	  centred	  
around	  the	  Auschwitz	  complex	  (Krakowski,	  1994).	  	  
	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  entire	  region	  around	  Auschwitz	  was	  converted	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  expanded	  spazio-­‐soglia,	  
where	  topographical	  and	  topological	  rationalities	  were	  intertwined	  in	  an	  inextricable	  way.	  These	  
entanglements	  had	  a	  double	  effect:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  camp	  were	  extended	  to	  the	  
entire	  region	  –	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  sovereignty	  was	  transferred	  from	  civic	  authority	  to	  the	  
Commandant	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  that	  became	  a	  sort	  of	  unique	  and	  enormous	  space	  of	  exception.	  On	  the	  
other,	  this	  greater	  “Auschwitzed’	  region	  was	  anything	  but	  a	  homogenous	  and	  isotropic	  space.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  the	  camp-­‐region	  was	  a	  highly	  fragmented	  space,	  crossed	  by	  endless	  movements	  of	  prisoners	  
from	  one	  sub-­‐camp	  to	  another,	  regulated	  as	  they	  were	  by	  the	  calculative	  (ir)rationalities	  of	  the	  selection	  
process	  (Wiesel,	  2006).	  The	  frenzy	  of	  activities	  taking	  place	  in	  this	  galaxy	  of	  sub-­‐camps	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  
disturbing	  corollary	  to	  the	  systematic	  extermination	  operated	  in	  Birkenau.	  All	  these	  complicated	  (and	  
only	  partially	  rational)	  complementarities	  and	  their	  related	  movements	  of	  people	  and	  things,	  rendered	  
life	  in	  the	  camp-­‐region	  –	  especially	  the	  prisoners’	  life	  –	  extremely	  unstable	  and	  mutable,	  since	  the	  status	  
of	  the	  victims	  depended	  entirely	  on	  the	  equally	  mutable	  functions	  of	  this	  monstrous	  spazio-­‐soglia	  and	  of	  
its	  mobile	  borders.	  It	  was	  through	  and	  within	  this	  threshold	  that	  the	  destiny	  of	  the	  inmate,	  as	  well	  the	  
very	  possibility	  of	  surviving	  via	  the	  assignment	  to	  a	  sub-­‐camp	  where	  conditions	  were	  less	  harsh,	  were	  
produced	  and	  negotiated,	  very	  often	  through	  a	  semi-­‐arbitrary	  ‘imbroglio’	  of	  rational	  and	  irrational	  
notions	  and	  related	  practices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Nazi	  administration	  (Krakowsi,	  1994:	  58).	  For	  this	  very	  
reason,	  it	  might	  prove	  useful	  at	  this	  point	  to	  move	  to	  another	  scale	  –	  that	  of	  the	  camp	  proper,	  to	  see	  how	  
this	  sort	  of	  imbroglio	  was	  actually	  essential	  to	  the	  very	  functioning	  of	  the	  thanatopolitical	  machine	  (see	  
Agamben,	  2002).	  	  
	  
Mexico	  
Whilst	  the	  geographies	  of	  the	  extended	  camp-­‐region	  reveal	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  underlying	  and	  inherent	  
tension	  and	  an	  enmeshment	  between	  the	  ‘topographical’	  and	  the	  ‘topological’,	  this	  tension	  emerges	  
even	  more	  evidently	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  internal	  spaces	  of	  the	  camp.	  In	  particular,	  one	  extension	  of	  the	  
Birkenau	  camp	  deserves	  closer	  investigation:	  named	  by	  the	  Polish	  inmates	  ‘Mexico’	  (Meksyk	  in	  Polish),	  
this	  area	  was	  located	  just	  outside	  the	  formal	  borders	  of	  the	  camp	  and	  represented	  a	  sort	  of	  internal	  
exception	  to	  the	  topographical	  nature	  of	  the	  camp	  itself.	  The	  term	  ‘Mexico’	  referred	  to	  the	  traditional	  
ways	  in	  which	  different	  districts	  were	  informally	  denominated	  in	  some	  Polish	  towns,	  with	  areas	  known	  as	  
‘Mexico’	  perceived	  as	  the	  most	  dangerous	  (Charlesworth,	  2003:	  509-­‐510).	  
	  	  
Mexico	  raises	  some	  troubling	  questions:	  why	  name,	  within	  an	  extermination	  camp,	  an	  area	  that	  was	  
more	  dangerous	  than	  others?	  What	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  different	  danger	  inherent	  in	  Mexico?	  Perhaps	  
the	  label	  Mexico	  had	  not	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  danger,	  but	  rather	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  
borderzone,	  of	  a	  liminal	  space	  of	  indistinction,	  since	  it	  represented	  a	  sort	  of	  no-­‐man’s-­‐land	  within	  the	  
camp	  where	  literally	  anything	  could	  happen.	  Its	  main	  characteristic	  was	  in	  fact	  that	  here	  the	  precarious	  
conditions	  of	  the	  camp	  were	  taken	  to	  their	  extremes.	  Mexico	  had	  a	  relatively	  short	  life,	  since	  its	  
construction	  started	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1943,	  only	  to	  be	  suspended	  in	  April	  1944,	  and	  indefinitely	  interrupted	  
in	  October	  of	  the	  same	  year,	  when	  the	  barracks	  were	  dismantled	  and	  brought	  to	  another	  camp	  (Lasik	  et	  
al.,	  2000:	  100).	  	  
	  
The	  literature	  on	  Mexico	  is	  remarkably	  scarce.	  Even	  Pressac,	  in	  what	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  
studies	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  gas	  chambers	  in	  the	  Final	  Solution,	  dedicates	  only	  a	  few	  lines	  to	  Mexico	  where	  
he	  confirms	  its	  function	  as	  a	  space	  of	  ‘transit’	  (1989:	  512).	  In	  theory,	  Mexico	  had	  been	  conceived	  to	  host	  
hundreds	  of	  thousand	  of	  Hungarian	  Jewish	  women	  deported	  in	  1944	  from	  the	  liquidated	  ghettos	  
(Strzelecka,	  1994:	  395),	  and	  it	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  the	  acceleration	  of	  extermination	  in	  those	  months	  
made	  its	  completion	  somewhat	  unnecessary.	  Within	  this	  perspective,	  Mexico	  seems	  to	  have	  played	  the	  
role	  of	  an	  extended	  spazio-­‐soglia	  connecting	  Auschwitz’s	  camp(s)	  to	  the	  external	  world	  in	  the	  calculative	  
‘production	  of	  corpses’.	  In	  Mexico	  the	  deportees	  were	  ‘selected’	  and	  re-­‐directed	  either	  towards	  the	  gas	  
chambers	  or	  towards	  the	  labour	  camps	  (Iwasko	  et	  al.,	  2000:	  246).	  However,	  Mexico	  also	  represented	  in	  
many	  ways	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  topographical	  order	  that	  dominated	  the	  Auschwitz	  project.	  The	  tensions	  
between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  that	  we	  have	  highlighted	  so	  far,	  there	  found	  a	  clearer	  and	  
more	  explicit	  expression.	  In	  Mexico,	  the	  calculative	  rationality	  of	  Nazi	  planning	  was	  in	  part	  suspended	  by	  
the	  lack	  of	  order	  and	  efficiency	  that	  appeared	  to	  dominate	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Auschwitz-­‐Birkenau	  complex.	  
Langbein	  underlines	  the	  lack	  of	  organisation	  and	  rationalisation	  in	  Mexico,	  with	  a	  chronic	  shortage	  of	  
water,	  permanent	  overcrowding,	  and	  related	  fights	  over	  who	  should	  sleep	  on	  the	  floor	  and	  who	  should	  
remain	  seated	  (2004:	  91,	  173,	  323).	  According	  to	  a	  Hungarian	  deportee,	  Mexico	  was	  “the	  poorest	  of	  the	  
poor”	  (Isaacson,	  1991:	  68).	  The	  overall	  suspension	  of	  the	  topographical	  order	  of	  the	  camp	  is	  confirmed	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  in	  August	  1944,	  Mexico	  was	  where	  women	  arriving	  from	  Hungarian	  ghettos	  were	  
‘concentrated’,	  without	  any	  registration	  number	  assigned	  to	  them	  (Durchgangs-­‐Juden,	  passage-­‐Jews),	  
while	  they	  were	  waiting	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  women’s	  section,	  or	  directly	  to	  the	  gas	  chambers	  (Sofsky,	  1999:	  
51).	  “Formally	  they	  were	  not	  prisoners	  of	  Auschwitz	  concentration	  camp,	  since	  they	  were	  not	  entered	  in	  
the	  camp	  records.	  Their	  fate	  remained	  to	  be	  decided”	  (Lasik	  et	  al.,	  2000:	  99).	  The	  lack	  of	  registration	  is	  
even	  more	  meaningful	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  Auschwitz	  was	  the	  only	  camp	  where	  the	  matriculation	  number	  
of	  the	  inmates	  was	  tattooed	  on	  their	  skins	  and	  not	  simply	  stamped	  on	  their	  uniforms.	  This	  practice,	  
however,	  was	  not	  implemented	  in	  Mexico	  (Langbein,	  2004:	  48).	  
	  
It	  does	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise,	  then,	  that	  Mexico	  remained	  a	  site	  of	  contested	  memories	  in	  the	  decades	  
that	  followed	  liberation,	  and	  that	  it	  has	  often	  been	  cited	  by	  revisionists	  like	  Mark	  Weber,	  Director	  of	  the	  
Institute	  for	  Historical	  Review,	  who	  has	  based	  his	  denial	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  also	  by	  speculating	  on	  the	  
uncertain	  destination	  of	  this	  secondary	  camp	  which,	  according	  to	  some	  sources,	  should	  have	  become	  an	  
hospital	  (Mattogno,	  1999;	  Weber,	  1999).	  Even	  now,	  Mexico	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  visitor	  of	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  
sort	  of	  meaningless	  tabula	  rasa,	  an	  empty	  space	  without	  signs	  of	  its	  infamous	  past	  and	  hence	  exempt	  
from	  the	  process	  of	  ‘monumentalisation’	  that	  has	  transformed	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  camp	  complex.	  
Remarkably,	  Charlesworth	  and	  Addis	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  progressive	  ‘return	  to	  nature’	  of	  
Birkenau’s	  third	  section	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  deliberate	  decision	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  authorities	  in	  charge	  of	  
the	  ‘heritage’	  of	  Birkenau	  to	  focus	  entirely	  on	  the	  first	  two	  sectors	  of	  greater	  historical	  (and	  tourist)	  
interest,	  while	  Mexico	  has	  become	  as	  sort	  of	  buffer	  zone	  –	  a	  threshold,	  (again?)	  –	  between	  the	  camp	  and	  
the	  nearby	  village	  (2002:	  245),	  a	  zone	  in	  which	  some	  modest	  rural	  activity	  is	  even	  practised.	  It	  appears	  as	  
if,	  even	  today,	  Mexico	  cannot	  find	  a	  proper	  place	  in	  the	  space	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  a	  space	  now	  entirely	  re-­‐
organised	  for	  the	  visitor;	  as	  if	  the	  only	  possibility	  was	  that	  of	  returning	  it	  to	  nature,	  to	  the	  birch	  forest	  
from	  which	  Birkenau’s	  denomination	  derived.	  	  
	  
What	  is	  even	  more	  important	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  our	  argument	  is	  that	  Mexico’s	  unique	  status	  was	  also	  
related	  to	  ideas	  of	  escape	  and	  survival.	  The	  most	  significant	  event	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Mexico	  was	  Walter	  
Rosenberg	  (aka	  Rudolf	  Vrba)	  and	  Alfred	  Wetzler’s	  widely	  celebrated	  escape	  described	  in	  the	  Vrba	  and	  
Wetzler	  Report,	  which	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  complete	  reports	  of	  the	  extent	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  
the	  extermination	  machine	  circulated	  before	  the	  war’s	  end	  in	  April	  1944.	  Although	  their	  escape	  was	  
officially	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  Nazis	  on	  April	  7th	  1944,	  the	  two	  inmates	  had	  hidden	  within	  Mexico	  for	  
another	  three	  days	  (Karny,	  1994:	  553).	  Their	  successful	  plan	  represented	  a	  true	  challenge	  to	  the	  
topographical	  rationality	  of	  Auschwitz.	  In	  their	  own	  account	  of	  the	  escape,	  we	  find	  a	  powerful	  description	  
of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  rational	  and	  orderly	  organisation	  of	  the	  camp,	  and	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  a	  
topological	  threshold	  that	  allowed	  for	  a	  way	  out:	  it	  was	  precisely	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  deep	  
structure	  of	  the	  topographical	  machine	  of	  the	  camp	  that	  had	  translated	  it	  into	  a	  weapon	  capable	  of	  
defeating	  its	  rationality	  and	  unveiling	  its	  nature	  as	  a	  spazio-­‐soglia.	  
The	  mother	  camp	  of	  Auschwitz	  [...]	  was	  divided	  into	  an	  outer	  camp	  in	  which	  we	  worked	  and	  an	  inner	  
camp	  in	  which	  we	  slept.	  The	  inner	  camp	  in	  Birkenau	  was	  guarded	  by	  a	  trench	  six	  yards	  wide	  and	  five	  
yards	  deep.	  It	  was	  filled	  with	  water.	  Then	  came	  two	  barbed	  wire	  high	  voltage	  fences	  five	  yards	  high.	  Arc	  
lamps	  played	  constantly	  on	  the	  inner	  camp	  at	  night	  and	  SS	  men	  with	  machine	  guns	  surveyed	  it	  from	  
watch	  towers.	  In	  the	  morning	  these	  guards	  stood	  down	  after	  we	  had	  gone	  to	  work	  and	  fresh	  guards	  
manned	  towers	  on	  the	  perimeter	  of	  the	  outer	  camp	  which	  was	  about	  four	  miles	  long.	  The	  approaches	  to	  
this	  perimeter	  were	  absolutely	  barren	  and	  no	  prisoner	  could	  cross	  them	  in	  daylight	  without	  being	  caught	  
in	  cross-­‐fire	  from	  the	  towers.	  If	  a	  prisoner	  did	  manage	  to	  sneak	  through	  this	  network,	  if	  he	  was	  reported	  
missing	  from	  the	  inner	  camp	  at	  night,	  the	  outer	  towers	  were	  manned	  and	  reinforcements	  –	  3000	  men	  
and	  200	  dogs	  –	  were	  called	  in	  to	  seal	  off	  the	  entire	  area.	  This	  massive	  guard	  stayed	  on	  duty	  for	  three	  days	  
and	  nights	  while	  troops	  and	  dogs	  fine-­‐combed	  the	  camp.	  If	  the	  prisoner	  had	  not	  been	  recaptured	  by	  that	  
time,	  it	  was	  presumed	  that	  he	  had	  escaped	  beyond	  the	  camp	  where	  other	  S.S.	  men	  were	  searching	  
already.	  The	  guard	  was	  dismissed	  then	  and	  the	  matter	  was	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  authorities	  beyond	  
Auschwitz.	  It	  was	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  a	  man	  who	  could	  remain	  hidden	  beyond	  the	  inner	  perimeter	  for	  three	  
days	  and	  three	  nights	  had	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  (Vrba	  and	  Bestic,	  1964:	  201-­‐202,	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  
An	  escape	  from	  the	  topography	  of	  the	  camp	  could	  be	  realised	  only	  in	  a	  spazio-­‐soglia	  located,	  at	  once,	  
both	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  camp.	  Mexico	  allowed,	  in	  fact,	  for	  a	  double	  dispositif	  of	  exclusive	  inclusion	  
to	  operate:	  a	  spatial	  and	  a	  temporal	  one,	  that	  is,	  a	  true	  dispositif	  of	  displacement,	  a	  spatial	  threshold	  
where	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  be,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  camp	  –	  and	  a	  temporal	  
threshold	  (within	  the	  crucial	  three	  days)	  that	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  locate	  the	  fugitives	  in	  the	  Auschwitzed	  
camp-­‐region.	  
	  
Nonetheless,	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  literature	  on	  Mexico	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  spatialities	  of	  Auschwitz	  remains	  
remarkably	  scarce.	  We	  believe,	  however,	  that	  Mexico	  is	  a	  key	  site	  in	  better	  understanding	  the	  unstable	  
spatialities	  of	  the	  camp,	  since	  it	  served	  as	  a	  transient	  space	  and	  was	  characterised	  by	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  
its	  function	  and	  of	  its	  final	  destination:	  it	  represented	  a	  site	  where	  the	  otherwise	  latent	  tension	  between	  
the	  topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  in	  the	  camp	  and	  the	  camp-­‐region	  came	  together	  and	  became	  
shockingly	  explicit.	  If	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  need	  to	  interrogate	  the	  geographical	  meaning	  of	  Mexico	  
and,	  with	  it,	  of	  the	  camp-­‐region	  of	  Auschwitz	  is	  an	  urgent	  task.	  Mexico	  was	  in	  fact	  not	  merely	  a	  spazio-­‐
soglia	  inside	  a	  topographical	  space;	  rather,	  it	  represented	  a	  site	  where	  the	  spatialisation	  of	  the	  dialectic	  
between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  that	  traversed	  the	  entire	  project	  of	  the	  camp	  became	  
visible,	  where	  the	  norm	  and	  its	  suspension	  were	  explicitly	  performed	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Mexico	  was	  
where	  the	  internal	  and	  the	  external	  came	  together	  all	  the	  time,	  where	  two	  fugitives	  could	  hide	  inside	  the	  
camp	  complex	  while	  the	  (topographical	  minds	  of	  the)	  guards	  were	  looking	  for	  them	  outside.	  In	  Mexico	  it	  
was	  possible	  to	  be	  outside	  of	  Auschwitz	  by	  remaining	  inside,	  albeit	  for	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  time.	  	  
	  
Mexico	  was	  not	  just	  an	  unfinished	  project	  or	  a	  marginal	  space,	  or	  an	  ‘imperfection’	  of	  the	  camp,	  as	  the	  
scarce	  interest	  for	  it	  in	  the	  literature	  might	  persuade	  one	  to	  think.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  our	  claim	  is	  that	  
Mexico	  was	  the	  site	  in	  which	  the	  coming	  together	  and	  indistinction	  between	  the	  external	  and	  internal	  
logic	  of	  the	  camp,	  between	  the	  camp	  proper	  and	  its	  ‘region’,	  between	  the	  barbed	  wire	  and	  the	  
celebrative	  use	  of	  the	  gates,	  materialised	  and	  made	  visible	  the	  unstable	  nature	  of	  the	  spatialities	  of	  the	  
camp	  –	  and	  indeed	  of	  the	  geopolitical	  and	  biopolitical	  Nazi	  project	  for	  Eastern	  Europe.	  
	  
AFTER	  AUSCHWITZ	  
The	  Auschwitz	  project	  –	  and	  the	  urban	  and	  regional	  complex	  organised	  around	  the	  camp	  itself	  –	  was	  a	  
striking	  expression	  of	  a	  modern	  rationality	  that	  was	  translated	  into	  the	  geometries	  of	  its	  barracks,	  of	  its	  
connecting	  lines	  and	  points,	  its	  networks,	  its	  barbed	  wires,	  and	  its	  visible	  and	  invisible	  borders.	  However,	  
within	  these	  rigid	  spatialities,	  topography,	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  order(ing)	  and	  separation,	  was	  at	  once	  both	  
affirmed	  and	  negated.	  This	  apparently	  disorderly	  sequence	  of	  affirmation	  and	  negation	  of	  the	  ‘rules	  of	  
the	  game’	  was	  part	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  space	  of	  exception,	  as	  has	  been	  argued	  by	  
Agamben	  and	  many	  others.	  The	  always	  possible	  and	  fully	  arbitrary	  suspension	  of	  the	  rule	  was	  in	  a	  sense	  a	  
constitutive	  element	  of	  the	  project,	  together	  with	  the	  forceful	  imposition	  of	  the	  rule	  with	  its	  often	  
nonsensical	  geometries.	  Rule	  and	  suspension	  of	  the	  rule	  constituted	  the	  Nomos	  of	  the	  camp	  –	  the	  norm	  
that	  was	  founded	  on	  its	  own	  (semi-­‐arbitrary)	  suspension.	  The	  topographical	  dimension	  of	  the	  camp	  was	  
therefore	  only	  one	  element	  of	  the	  project.	  To	  work	  as	  a	  space	  of	  exception	  and	  as	  a	  site	  of	  permanent	  
potential	  suspension	  of	  the	  rule	  –	  and	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  be	  ‘full	  of	  rules’	  –	  the	  camp	  needed	  the	  
constant	  presence	  and	  penetration	  of	  the	  topological,	  what	  Agamben	  would	  define	  as	  a	  ‘varco’	  (see	  
Minca,	  2007:	  90),	  a	  sort	  of	  omnipresent	  but	  only	  partially	  regulated	  relationship	  with	  the	  outside.	  
Because	  of	  this	  complicated	  and	  undefined	  interpenetration	  between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  
topological,	  the	  murderous	  biopolitical	  machine	  of	  the	  camp	  could	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  gigantic	  
spazio-­‐soglia.	  	  
	  
What	  we	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  in	  conclusion,	  then,	  is	  that	  reading	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  spazio-­‐soglia	  can	  be	  of	  
some	  use	  in	  order	  to	  unravel	  the	  imbroglio	  of	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  that	  produced	  such	  a	  
powerful	  biopolitical	  machine,	  but	  also	  to	  unveil	  the	  broader	  tensions	  between	  the	  functional	  and	  the	  
ideological,	  modernity	  and	  barbarism,	  bureaucracy	  and	  violence,	  rational	  and	  irrational,	  that	  placed	  the	  
camp	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  larger	  biopolitical	  and	  geopolitical	  project.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  perspective,	  we	  suggest,	  
that	  Agamben’s	  concept	  of	  the	  soglia	  can	  be	  of	  some	  use	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  calculation,	  
measurement,	  and	  classification	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  camp	  and	  in	  its	  relationship	  with	  modernity.	  
Moreover,	  this	  spazio-­‐soglia	  can	  be	  a	  potentially	  powerful	  tool	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  how	  certain	  
antinomies	  come	  together	  and	  are	  rendered	  indistinguishable	  in	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  exception	  and	  
how,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  they	  collapse	  into	  the	  materialities	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  what	  is	  the	  
ultimate	  space	  of	  exception,	  the	  camp.	  
	  
Is	  this	  a	  lesson	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  beyond	  the	  Auschwitz	  ‘laboratory’	  (Levi,	  1959)?	  What	  can	  be	  learned	  
from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  blurring	  between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  was	  not	  just	  immaterial,	  
symbolic,	  and	  procedural,	  but	  was	  rather	  fully	  embodied	  in	  the	  materialities	  of	  the	  camp?	  The	  first	  
question	  is,	  of	  course,	  whether	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  spatialities	  of	  the	  Nazi	  camp	  can	  provide	  
further	  insight	  into	  some	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  debate	  in	  Holocaust	  Studies	  
over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  –	  such	  as	  the	  role	  played	  by	  (modern)	  calculative	  rationality	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  
the	  Final	  Solution	  or	  the	  exceptional	  nature	  of	  the	  Auschwitz	  experiment.	  For	  geographers,	  it	  could	  be	  
equally	  important	  to	  ask	  whether	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  spatialities	  of	  the	  camp	  can	  be	  of	  use	  for	  other	  fields	  
of	  enquiry	  and,	  in	  particular,	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  geographies	  of	  exception	  that	  have	  taken	  shape	  after	  
9/11.	  Is	  the	  above	  described	  interplay	  between	  the	  topographic	  and	  the	  topological	  a	  dispositif	  that	  can	  
be	  identified	  in	  other	  (contemporary)	  spaces	  of	  exception?	  How	  can	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  
the	  spazio-­‐soglia	  contribute	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  such	  geographies?	  We	  hope	  that	  this	  brief	  incursion	  
into	  the	  spatialities	  of	  Auschwitz	  can	  help	  not	  only	  to	  better	  understand	  its	  biopolitical	  machinery,	  but	  
also	  to	  theorise	  how	  the	  spatial	  threshold	  between	  the	  topographical	  and	  the	  topological	  remains	  at	  the	  
core	  of	  all	  geographies	  of	  exception	  and	  terror.	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